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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the “make or buy” decision of food firms applied to innovation 
strategy using 389 Italian food firms data from the Unicredit 2007 database. We 
develop a set of hypothesis from three theoretical perspectives such as transaction cost 
economics, strategic management and resource-based view. Our paper aims at 
highlight whether or not different  firm’s features can be linked to the decision to make 
or buy. We found out that these two decisions are positively interlinked. Moreover we 
also found out that it is difficult to indicate a clear-cut behaviour for the Italian food 
firms if we refer to making or buying decisions. We discuss these results and use them to 
bring some interesting outcomes to discuss managerial implications and/or policy 
interventions in this highly strategic domain. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, both the evolution of food demand, which brought more attention to 
quality and safety issues, and the increasing international competition that pushes the 
pace of technological change, have led to a higher rate of innovation in the food 
industry (Capitanio et al., 2010). Diversification and quality innovation (Traill and 
Meulenberg, 2002), as well as process innovations are becoming major factors of 
competitiveness. As a European commission online magazine on enterprise policy 
indicates: “Innovative food production systems, higher quality standards, and an 
evolution towards value-added products are important ingredients in meeting the 
challenges posed by more competitive food markets”.1Next to the decisions on whether 
to innovate or not and what innovation, is the decision of how to innovate. As Veugelers 
and Cassiman (1999) pointed out, given their uncertain returns and short life cycles, 
investments in risky sunk R&D expenditures have taken an overriding importance in the 
survival of firms. The decision to innovate “in-house” or to outsource the process of 
innovation is thus becoming an important aspect of firms’ strategic management. 
The empirical literature is replete with studies investigating the make or buy decision 
and most of these works are supportive of both the Williamsonian transaction costs 
theory and the property rights approach developed by Grossman, Hart and Moore (Klein 
2005). Besides the transaction cost reduction arguments, firms may have other reasons 
to choose between making and buying, especially when it comes to innovation 
                                                 
1http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/e_i/news/article_8571_en.htm 
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outsourcing. These reasons may relate to strategic management (e.g. market power, 
appropriability concerns, size of the firm),competence and resource-based elements 
(e.g. availability of in-house resources and capabilities) and the institutional 
environment (e.g. legal restrictions). 
The make or buy decision applied to a firm’s innovation sourcing strategy is receiving 
increasing attention in both the theoretical and empirical literature. Many works have 
been performed in the last ten years: Ulset (1996) on Norwegian information 
technology industry; Veugelers and Cassiman (1999) on the Belgium manufacturing 
industry; Love and Roper (2001); Love and Roper (2002) on UK manufacturing plants; 
Love and Roper (2005); Howells et al. (2008) on UK pharmaceuticals; Gooroochurn 
and Hanley (2007) on UK firms. Though growing fast, the literature has not yet 
investigated the case of the food sector. The innovation sourcing strategy of this 
unexplored sector might however differ from other economic sector since it has to deal 
with bio-based products. This peculiarity introduces many uncertainties at various levels 
of the processing process due to the fluctuating quality of inputs (e.g. unpredictable 
weather conditions and perishable nature of agricultural products) and the reliance on a 
multitude of more or less homogeneous farmers/suppliers. Moreover, new food 
products have generally a relatively low success rates (Søgaard 1994). 
This paper aims at filling this literature gaps by investigating the determinants of the 
make or buy decision applied to innovation strategies in the food industry using a 
database collected by Unicredit in 2007 on 389 firms operating in the Italian food 
industry (fruits, vegetables, vegetal oil, wine and dairy). In order to have the most 
complete picture of the relevant determinants of make or buy in innovation, we make 
use of three theoretical approach to develop our hypothesis: transaction costs 
economics, strategic management and resource-based view. Our empirical analysis is 
presented in two steps. In the first one, we describe the relationship between food firms 
and their innovativeness. In the second step, we use a bivariate probit model to test the 
correlation between “making” and “buying” decisions and to highlight the main driving 
factors of innovation strategies in the Italian food sector. 
Our main results show that making and buying innovation are correlated and interlinked 
decisions while a clear-cut behaviour which can distinguish food companies oriented to 
make to the ones oriented to buy innovations cannot be draw based on our empirical 
evidences.  
This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we introduce the concept of innovation as 
used in this paper and we elaborate on the theoretical elements used to develop our 
hypothesis. In section 3, we present our empirical analysis with a first glance at some 
descriptive statistics before introducing our empirical model. Section 4 shows the 
results while in section 5 we discuss and conclude with policy and managerial 
implications. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
2.1.Innovation in the Food Sector 
 
The theme of innovation was approached from very different theoretical points of view. 
We can recognized two main economic fields of research: on one side the political 
economics approaches, which treated innovation at a sectorial/country level to analyze 
how innovation influence the development processes of an industry or a region (Dosi et 
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al., 1988; Nelson, 1993; Omta, Folstar, 2005). In this perspective innovation is mainly 
seen as an inter-temporal technological change.  On the other side innovation is studied 
jointly with the analysis of private firm strategical/managerial decisions. In this case 
innovation is seen as the creation, development and introduction on the market of a new 
product (Omta, 2002; Omta, 2004; Omta, Folstar, 2005). The studies following this 
perspective are differentiated on the base of the economic sector, firm types, location 
and nature of innovations (product, process and/or organization) analyzed. It is easy to 
understand that on the base of the different approaches several definitions of 
innovations were adopted.  
Innovation could be seen as a complex process in which each firm can be involved at 
different stages, from basic research up to the penetration of the market with new 
product, to reach a competitive advantage with respect to the other firms (Hollenstein, 
1996; Omta, 2004). At firm level two ways to look at innovation can be distinguished. 
Firstly innovation can be studied as a development and change process (Teece, 1996; 
Grunert et. al., 1997). In this sense the innovative process is directly influenced by the 
level of expenditure, by the way R&D activities are carried out, for example by means 
of internal or external structures (Pavitt, 1984; Molero and Buesa, 1996; Acs and 
Audretsch, 1998), as well as by the “technological” characteristics of the  innovation 
process, such as the degree of uncertainty related to the effectiveness and market 
success of innovations, the level of taciteness of knowledge, the degree of 
appropriability of innovation, and by the capacity of cumulate know-how inside the 
organisation (Teece, 1996). Secondly, innovation can be the analysed as the firm 
attitude to find and satisfy the needs and the preferences of its potential customers, 
using the own resources, skills and capacities (Grunert et al., 1996). In this case 
innovation is a process correlated to the market orientation of the firm and to the 
marketing activities. In the former case innovation might be seen as a technological 
process, while in the latter as a managerial and organisational process.  
In fact, the two processes are strictly linked to each other. In a private enterprise, the 
research and development of new products, technologies and process (organisation of 
the innovation) have to be oriented by a strategy based on the commercialisation of the 
results obtained (Grunert et al., 1997; Traill and Meulenberg, 2002; Omta, 2004). 
Therefore, it is more appropriate to speak of innovativeness instead of innovation, 
considering the type of R&D activities, the market-oriented activities, and the way they 
are coordinate in the firm organisational model (Traill and Meulenberg, 2002). In this 
perspective the concept of innovativeness becomes by itself a key element to cluster and 
identify the nature of the firm in which the process is taking place. Innovativeness is a 
consistent part of the strategies of the firm and it influences both the organisational 
structure and the external linkages. Among them, the dimension of the market and the 
growth of the demand play a very relevant role as they have an influence on the 
incentive to innovate (Earle, 1997).  
The definition of innovation that we used in this paper refers to the firm/management 
“study area” and can be synthesized in three key-concepts (Zaltman et al., 1973; Omta, 
2004): (i) a creation of a new product/service (in this case innovation derives from a 
creative process in which an idea is transformed through the activities of R&D, 
management and production, into a new product and/or service); (ii) a process of 
development of new products/services (in this case innovation derives from R&D and 
market demand analysis activities to change/modify/adapt an existent product/service); 
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(iii) a process of diffusion of new products/services (in this case innovations derives 
from the adoption of a new process/products originated in a different sector/firm). 
The decision to outsource innovative activities or R&D has to take into account a 
number of peculiarities that lie in the distinctive nature of innovation compared to other 
goods or activities (Howells 2006). Howells et al. (2008: 206) have made an exhaustive 
inventory of these peculiarities. First, the outcome of the outsourced innovation is 
highly uncertain and risky compared to other activities (Doctor et al. 2001). Second, the 
firm outsourcing cannot evaluate the quality of the knowledge that is transferred to them 
by the supplier (Arrow 1962). Third, the fact that the supplier of an innovation often 
does not know the quality of the knowledge it sells, because it does not know the future 
outcomes of its innovation, may lead to contractual incompleteness problem related to 
intellectual property exchange. Fourth, both partners, the firm and the customer, are 
involved in a co-joint production of new knowledge which may lead to intellectual 
property rights rent-sharing issues (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). Fifth, innovation 
outsourcing may lead to a whole set of moral hazard problems such as the use of the 
knowledge transferred to the supplier for other customers. Sixth, if outsourcing goes 
wrong, the future of the firm can be threatened given the importance of R&D and 
innovation as core competences and capabilities of firms. Seventh, outsourcing 
decisions have an irreversible effect on R&D or technical capacity of the firm. Eighth, 
the exchange of information during the outsourcing process is a unique event which 
limits the capacity of firms to learn from experience (Carter 1989). Ninth, tacit nature of 
the know-how exchanged when outsourcing makes it difficult to monitor 
contracts.These characteristics are not unique to innovation per se, other outsourced 
activities also show these features, but their combination surely is.  
The list presented by Howells et al. (2008) could be extended when applied to the food 
sector.This economic sector handles bio-based products which show features that may 
lead to more uncertainty in the innovation process. Bio-based products have a greater 
fluctuating quality than manufactured products due to the perishable nature of 
agricultural products and the unpredictable weather conditions affecting the quantity 
and quality of products. Food firms also have to rely on a multitude of more or less 
homogeneous farmer/suppliers. These features of the food sector add to the existing 
uncertainty of the innovative activities. Moreover, new food products have generally a 
relatively low success rates as noticed by Søgaard (1994). Finally, innovation 
outsourcing has a greater importance within the food industry, where R&D intensity 
could be a non-exhaustive indicator to catch the innovativeness, because of some 
specific features of its innovation pattern: (i) food firms are mainly process-innovation 
oriented (Archibugi et al., 1991) and use new technologies developed by upstream 
industries. Then, innovation mainly occurs through equipment and capital goods 
investments; (ii) innovations in the food industry are mainly incremental rather than 
radical ones (Galizzi and Venturini, 2008).  
 
2.2.Determinants of the make or buy decision 
 
The transaction cost theory has proved to be quite successful in explaining the decision 
of firms to make in-house or to outsource activities.When it comes to innovation 
sourcing, the relevance of this theoretical framework seems however to be limited. A 
number of authors have argued that firms faced with the decision to innovate in-house 
or to outsource are more motivated by strategic (Gooroochurn and Hanley 2007; 
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Howells 2006; Howells et al. 2008) or resources (Conner and Prahalad 1996; Love and 
Roper 2005; Nooteboom 2004) rather than transaction costs considerations. When 
investigating the determinants of the make or buy decision applied to innovation 
outsourcing, transaction costs but also competence/resource-based approaches and 
strategic reasons must be taken into account. In this section, we present the make or buy 
innovation determinants according to the three theoretical background aforementioned 
(transaction cost economics, strategic management and resource-based view) and 
develop hypothesis to be tested. 
 
2.2.1 Transaction cost economics 
 
Outsourcing innovation allows firms to tap into advanced knowledge and technology, as 
well as to obtain a cost advantage (Gooroochurn and Hanley 2007; Ulset 1996). The 
downside of these advantages, especially when outsourcing innovation, is that 
transaction costs of control losses, maladaptations and technology leakages may be 
incurred. The sources of transaction costs in outsourcing innovation activities lie in the 
uncertainty and non-redeployability of efforts or assets (such as R&D sunk costs and 
customized R&D output). Contractual partners will thus seek to develop safeguards 
such as stronger administrative control rights and more exclusive property rights. 
Transaction costs economics argues that firms that incur heavy sunk costs in capital or 
R&D expenditures may want to amortize these costs by innovating in-house  
(Gooroochurn and Hanley2007). On the other hand, we can think that for strategic 
reasons, firms may want to invest in R&D to raise their absorptive capacity. These firms 
would then favour outsourcing in order to benefit from outside collaboration.  
 
Hypothesis 1. Firms having high sunk costs of capital and R&D will be more incline to 
favour in-house innovation sourcing, except in the case of strategic outsourcing. 
 
Another factor which can influence firm “off-house” innovation activities is related to 
the nature of the other contracting activities of the firm such as the chain and network 
relations. These include the linkages between the food firm and other agents of the food 
chains (agriculture, distribution operators, etc.) and deal with the attitude to enter in 
formal and/or relational networks (consortia, production-based association, 
manufacturing joint-ventures, informal contracts, etc.). The positive influence of such 
“contracting” strategies on the innovation capacities is given by the possibilities of 
sharing information and “know-how”, the reduction of uncertainty and the increasing 
economies of scale for the firms involved (Teece, 1996). 
 
Hypothesis 2. Firms that are part of a larger group of companies or of a relational 
network are more likely to innovate in-house to benefit reduction costs in reducing 
contractual uncertainty and accessing group resources.  
 
2.2.2. Strategic management 
 
The different capacity to innovate between investor owned firms (IOs) and cooperatives 
is gaining attention among social scientists as a consequence of the growing attitude of 
the cooperative model to innovate (Nilsson, 1997; Drivas, Giannakas, 2006). In 
particular, the “social environment” inside the cooperative is seen as a decisive factor of 
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innovation when management, workers and members behave as a coalition, 
coordinating their objectives (reducing the monitoring and agency costs). The presence 
of such organisational culture could help to surmount the problem of under-financial 
capacity, which remains one of the most relevant constrain for a cooperative to develop 
“in house” new projects and technologies. In fact, in many cooperatives the need to 
respect the member welfare-maximising objective through the distribution of the returns 
on sales still remains a factor of weakness that limits innovative activities (Nilsson, 
1997). 
 
Hypothesis 3. The organisation culture of cooperatives makes in-house innovation less 
costly than outsourcing. Cooperatives should then be more incline to innovate in-house. 
 
The degree of appropriability of innovation is also a main feature in determining 
making or buying decision (Love and Roper 2001; Gooroochurn and Hanley 2007).  
The ability of firms to appropriate post-innovation returns depends on the market 
structure, the nature of technology and the intellectual property rights regime (Teece 
1986). In situations where such conditions are tight, that is leakage is limited and 
imitation is difficult, firms will be more incline to outsource innovation. On the other 
hand, in situations where these conditions are weak, that is leakage is frequent and 
imitation easy, firms will prefer to innovate in-house (Love and Roper 2001). Because 
of the complexity related to the measurement of data availability of appropriability often 
used proxies are the type of regulatory barriers and market concentration/competition. 
 
Hypothesis 4. Firms evolving in tight appropriability conditions will be more incline to 
outsource innovation than firms evolving in a weak appropriability setting. 
 
The relation between firm complexity (size) and innovativeness was originally analysed 
by Schumpeter (Schumpeter, 1934 and 1942). The studies following this theoretical 
perspective emphasised the role of size and the capacity to allocate financial resources 
to research activities and to new technologies and products development (“in house” 
innovations) trough hierarchies (vertical integration of R&D activities). In this sense, 
large firms operating in a context of a strong market power should show higher 
investments in innovation activities than the small ones, due to larger cash flow 
generated by monopolistic power and to a better access to capital market (Teece, 1996; 
Arundel and Kabla, 1998). Other authors deeply contested this point of view, according 
to the idea that small and medium firms (SMEs) are more adaptable to the market 
conditions, more opened to “innovation joint-venture” and “contracting strategies” 
(“buying” innovation activities) (Omta, 2002; 2004) and less constrained by the 
transaction costs of “bureaucratical” and managerial structures (Williamson, 1975; 
Mansfield 1981; Teece, 1996). Moreover, SMEs show a higher internal flexibility 
(related to the organization of the production and to decision making processes), a better 
flow of internal communication, greater specialisation possibilities, as well as a higher 
informal and strategic control (Galende and de la Fuente, 2003). Since the relationship 
between size and sourcing strategy is ambiguous, we derived a general hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 5. The size of the firm has an effect on innovation sourcing strategy. 
Veugelers and Cassiman (1999) have noticed that process and generic products 
innovation are more likely to be outsourced than product and specialized innovations. 
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Since product innovation is considered as a firm-specific input, leakage through 
outsourcing has more important strategic implications than for generic process 
innovations. Leakage over generic R&D innovations cannot be used opportunistically 
by the supplier firm since most firms are contracting these innovations. Therefore, 
similar to Gooroochurn and Hanley (2007), we make the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 6. Process innovation is more likely to be outsourced than product 
innovation. 
 
2.2.3. Resource-based view 
Mason and Wagner (1994) have stressed the importance of highly skilled employees for 
innovation. Aurora and Gambardella (1994) have argued that internal knowledge 
resources allow to use foreign know-how more effectively in the firm, which would 
stimulate external innovation sourcing. On the other hand, high internal competences 
may be an incentive for firms to innovate in-house with available resources (Veugelers 
and Cassiman 1999). 
 
Hypothesis 7. Firms with constrained human resources are more likely to engage in 
outsourcing during the innovation process.  
 
The age of the firm can be used as another possible measure of its organisational 
complexity, potentially representing the experience and the knowledge accumulated 
throughout its history and the “learning” process of the firm (Galende and de la Fuente, 
2003). Some articles showed the higher inclination to innovate by “old” firms 
(Kuemmerle, 1998), while some other considered “young” enterprises as more active in 
the direction of innovation (Molero and Buesa, 1996). In this sense the age remains a 
controversial factor of innovation.  The knowledge transfer is influenced by the level of 
human quality, too. The way the firm acts in order to facilitate the cumulative learning 
can be assessed by the rate of economic and financial resources dedicated and oriented 
to the professional formation and its organisation inside the firm (Freeman, 1973; 
Rothwell, 1986). 
 
Hypothesis 8. ‘Old’ firms are more innovative than young ones.  
 
Some scholars have argued that better internal and external communication networks is 
an important features of innovative firms. Since better communication network is 
strongly linked to a better communication system, the presence of information and 
communication technology (ICT) in the firm should influence their willingness to 
outsource innovation. 
 
Hypothesis 9. Firms with a highly sophisticated information and communication 
technology system are more likely to outsource their innovation activities. 
 
2.2.4. Control variables 
 
Contracting activities can be analysed in an indirect way, looking at the results of their 
influence on the firm strategies on the markets, such as the internationalisation, the 
export-orientation and the product-diversification/specialization (Hoskisson and Hitt 
1988). The empirical literature shows a positive relationships between export 
8 
 
orientation and innovations (Lunn and Martin, 1986; Kumar and Saqib, 1996; Roper 
and Love, 2002), while the way product-diversification or specialisation affect firm 
innovation is not clearly recognised and remain still controversial (Hitt and Hoskisson, 
1991; Hoskisson and Johnson, 1992; Link, 1982; Chen, 1996). Since export activities 
might have an important effect on the decision to innovate, we use it as a control 
variable in our model.  
Moreover sourcing decisions are influenced by the context in which the firm operates. 
In other words, the geographical location and local networking of food firms are key 
factors behind different attitudes to innovativeness (Omta et al., 2001; Nielsen, 2008). 
The specific location of a firm is important to understand the opportunities to use local 
social capital and the institutional environment as a source of knowledge and 
innovativeness (Capitanio et al., 2009; 2010).  
 
3. The empirical analysis: testing the hypotheses for “making-buying” 
decisions  
 
3.1. Data and descriptive analysis 
 
In this paper we use part of a database from the 10
th 
survey on Italian manufacturing 
companies carried out by Unicredit Group. The database refers to a sample of 389 food 
companies with information related to the period 2004-2006. Data refer to financial and 
economic characteristics, organization, investments, internationalization and innovation 
processes. More specifically the dataset allow us to distinguish between internal and 
external sourcing of innovation activities. Therefore we defined the two dependent 
variables of our analysis as follow: 
 
(1) “making innovation” relates to R&D activities carried out by external entities 
and not by any division or department of the company. Moreover we consider as 
“making innovation condition” the presence of training activities for the 
employees of the company with the specific purpose of increasing the firm 
innovation capacities.  
(2) “buying innovation” relates to the presence of Research and Development 
(R&D) activities carried out within the company, due to the presence of a 
specific department or division. We also consider as a “buying condition” 
whenever the company indicates to have acquired technologies, industrial 
equipment, machineries, patents and/or know-how from other companies with 
the specific purpose of introducing new processes and/or products. 
 
About 1 out of 4 of the sample companies indicates that at least an activity of making or 
buying has been carried out in the 2004-2006 period.  Moreover the 20% of the sample 
shows a simultaneous presence of buying and making decisions while 5% of the sample 
only buys or only makes innovations (table 1).  
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Table 1 – Making and buying innovation in the Italian food companies  
Buy 
Make 
No Yes Total 
No 268 18 286 
Yes 20 83 103 
Total 288 101 389 
Source: own elaboration on Unicredit 2007 
 
To empirically test our theoretical hypotheses we use a set of variables which are 
presented in table 2: 
 
Table 2 - Descriptive of the explanatory variables used in the empirical approach 
Theoretical 
background 
Hypothesis Variable 
Statistics 
Mean S.D. 
Transaction Cost 
Economics  
H1 
Total amount of investment 2004-2006 inv_tot 127.79 227.73 
Total amount of R&D expenses 2004-
2006 
rd_tot 98.24 197.89 
H2 
Being part of a holding/group holding 0.19 0.46 
Participating in a consortium consort 0.07 0.25 
Strategic 
management  
H3 Being a cooperative coop 0.09 0.29 
H4 
Index of market concentration (% Turn-
over first 4 companies in the same 
sector of specialization) 
c4 34.00 24.40 
H5 Size (number of employees) tot_employ 54.17 92.30 
H6 
Presence of product innovation in_prod 0.43 0.50 
Presence of process innovation in_proc 0.19 0.39 
Resource-based 
view 
H7 
Number of skilled workers skilled_work 29.77 69.67 
Percentage of employees attending 
training activities 
per_training 6.41 20.16 
Percentage of employees dedicated to 
R&D activities 
per_empl_rd 5.53 17.35 
H8 Age of the firm age 31.47 25.86 
H9 Amount of investment in ICT (2006) inv_ict 0.54 0.58 
Control 
Percentage of R&D outsourced to 
Universities in the same region 
rd_reg_univ 2.13 13.82 
Percentage of R&D outsourced to other 
companies 
other_firms 1.47 11.80 
Presence of export activities export 0.63 0.61 
Capacity of capital accumulation in the 
region of location 
cap_stock 21.72 2.27 
Innovation capacity in the region of 
location 
in_capac 1.10 0.34 
Percentage of public R&D expenses in 
the region of location 
pub_r_d 0.52 0.22 
Percentage of private R&D expenses in 
the region of location 
priv_r_d 0.54 0.31 
Source: own elaboration on a. Unicredit, 2007; b. ISMEA, 2009; c. ISTAT, 2010 
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3.2. The empirical model 
 
A widely used approach to estimate the probabilities of choosing between alternative strategies 
is to implement a discrete-choice model (Masten and Saussier, 2002). In this case the observed 
innovation strategy (i.e. making or buying) is considered as an expression of a continuous latent 
variable reflecting the propensity to choose a specific option among different alternatives. 
The generic empirical model related to the firm j to choose an innovation strategy s can be 
written as follow: 
 
sjsjsj XY  
'
'
*     Ss    (1) 
otherwiseY
YifY
sj
sjsj
0
01 *


   Ss    (2) 
where 
*
sjY is the unobservable value of the strategy s for firm j (latent variable), sjY is the 
observable strategy choice, for s = 1 in case of buying strategy and s = 2 in case of making 
strategy. As defined in section 2
'
jX is the vector of explanatory variables for firm j, s  a vector 
of coefficients for strategy s and sj a vector of unobservable characteristics related to firm j and 
strategy s. We can derive the probability that strategy s is chosen by firm j ( sj ) as a function of 
the potential explanatory variables:  
 
)()()0()0()1( ''''
*
sjsjsjsjsjsjsjsj XFXPXPYPYP     (3) 
 
where F denotes the distribution function of the unobservable characteristics sj . 
Different econometric strategies can be implemented accordingly to the nature of the strategical 
choice analysed and the distributional form it is assumed for F (Verbeek, 2004). For example a 
relatively common approach is to use separate logit/probit models to depict the basic binary 
choice of for example innovate trough outsourcing or in house strategies. In this case the 
decision setting is about (1) innovate in house (making) and (2) outsourcing  (buying). This 
would lead to a system of (two) equations. The implicit assumption is that the probability of 
making is independent from the probability of buying. But there is a good chance that the firm 
likelihood to make is conditional to the decision whether or not to buy innovation. In other word 
these decisions are likely to be interrelated. The usual alternative would be to estimate a 
bivariate probit model. For each choice (making or buying) a probit model is estimated and it is 
assumed that the error terms for the two equations are correlated.  
The bivariate probit model enables us to model firm’s decisions to choose more than one 
contract simultaneously (Greene, 2008). Since the outcomes are treated as binary variables any 
combination of strategies is possible. The strategies can be complements rather that substitutes 
only. The two equation model (one for s = 1 and the other for s = 2) is featured by correlated 
disturbances, which (due to identification reasons) are assumed to follow a normal distribution 
(variance is normalized to unity). That is for each j
th
 firm: 
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    021  jj EE           
   1221 ,cov  jj                 (4) 
1]var[]var[ 21  jj                    
where is a vector of correlation parameters denoting the extent to which the error terms 
co-vary. Should this be the case, we would need to estimate the two equations jointly, following 
a bivariate normal distribution:     ,1,1,0,0, 221  . Because in this model we are 
interested in simultaneous strategical decisions we have to define the joint probability. For 
example, the probability of firm j of choosing making and buying strategies at the same time 
 121  jj YY  would be: 
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2
'
21
'
12
2122
'
11
'
221
21

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jj

 
   (5)   
In this model the log-likelihood is then a sum across the four possible stretagies variables 
(that is, four possible combinations of innovate  121  jj YY  and non-innovate 
 021  jj YY  times their associated probabilities (Greene, 2003). These probabilities may be 
drawn from (5) as well. The most relevant coefficients estimated in the model are 21,  and 
)( 12 . The latter, if significantly different from zero, will evaluate to which extent each pair 
of decisions are interrelated.  
 
4. Results  
 
Results from the bivariate probit model give indications on the correspondence between 
our theoretical hypotheses and the empirical evidences (table 3).  
The correlation between making and buying decisions (make) has been confirmed by 
the model results which indicate that the likelihood that a firm jointly consider strategy 
of out-sourcing and in-house realization of innovative projects is relatively high. This 
result is indeed intriguing from a theoretical perspective where often making-buying 
decisions are seen as alternatives rather than complements. Of course results refer to 
join decisions on innovation strategies which involve different type of innovative 
projects with different features. Therefore it would be necessary to analyse in further 
details the type of innovative projects implemented via in house strategies vis-à-vis the 
innovative projects implemented via out-sourcing strategies. 
If we look at the results related to the explanatory variables we can discuss the validity 
of our theoretical hypotheses in more detail. We stated in hypothesis 1 the “firms having 
high sunk costs of capital and R&D will be more incline to favour in-house innovation 
sourcing, except in the case of strategic outsourcing”. Results indicate a positive effect 
of R&D costs on both buying and making decisions while overall sunk costs (invest_tot) 
negatively affect the likelihood of the firm to buy innovation. Therefore we can state 
that the empirical results confirm the hypothesis indicating the presence of strategic 
outsourcing in case of high R&D investments. 
 

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Table 3 - Results of the bivariate probit model  
Variable 
Buy Make 
 Coef. S.E. 
  
   Coef. S.E. 
  
Total amount of 
investment 2004-2006 
inv_tot -0.001 ( 0.001 ) ** -0.001 ( 0.001 ) 
 
Total amount of R&D 
expenses 2004-2006 
rd_tot 0.007 ( 0.001 ) *** 0.006 ( 0.001 ) *** 
Being part of a 
holding 
holding 0.605 ( 0.323 ) * 0.201 ( 0.306 ) 
 
Participating in a 
consortium 
consort -0.134 ( 0.475 ) 
 
-0.353 ( 0.438 ) 
 
Cooperative coop 0.089 ( 0.486 ) 
 
0.568 ( 0.407 ) 
 
Index of market 
concentration  
c4 -0.005 ( 0.005 ) 
 
-0.011 ( 0.005 ) ** 
Size (number of 
employees) 
tot_employ -0.005 ( 0.008 ) 
 
-0.006 ( 0.004 ) 
 
Presence of product 
innovation 
in_prod 0.610 ( 0.246 ) ** 0.794 ( 0.222 ) *** 
Presence of process 
innovation 
in_proc 0.736 ( 0.321 ) ** 0.497 ( 0.286 ) * 
Number of skilled 
workers 
skilled_work -0.004 ( 0.010 ) 
 
-0.004 ( 0.006 ) 
 
Percentage of 
employees attending 
training activities 
per_training -0.007 ( 0.008 ) 
 
0.005 ( 0.005 ) 
 
Percentage of 
employees dedicated 
to R&D activities 
per_empl_rd -0.037 ( 0.011 ) *** -0.012 ( 0.007 ) 
 
Age of the firm age 0.011 ( 0.004 ) ** 0.001 ( 0.005 ) 
 
Amount of investment 
in ICT (2006) 
inv_ict 0.285 ( 0.224 ) 
 
0.726 ( 0.206 ) *** 
Percentage of R&D 
outsourced to 
Universities in the 
same region 
rd_reg_univ -0.030 ( 0.026 ) 
 
-0.026 ( 0.028 ) 
 
Percentage of R&D 
outsourced to other 
companies 
other_firms -0.008 ( 0.012 ) 
 
-0.012 ( 0.008 ) 
 
Presence of export 
activities 
export 0.190 ( 0.209 ) 
 
0.235 ( 0.165 ) 
 
Capacity of capital 
accumulation in the 
region of location 
cap_stock -0.054 ( 0.069 ) 
 
-0.219 ( 0.067 ) *** 
Innovation capacity in 
the region of location 
in_capac -2.069 ( 2.413 ) 
 
-3.512 ( 2.260 ) 
 
Percentage of public 
R&D expenses in the 
region of location 
pub_r_d 2.317 ( 2.298 ) 
 
2.988 ( 2.135 ) 
 
Percentage of private 
R&D expenses in the 
region of location 
priv_r_d 1.512 ( 2.549 ) 
 
3.109 ( 2.391 ) 
 
Constant cons -0.778 ( 1.763 ) 
 
3.298 ( 1.729 ) * 
Correlation between 
making and buying 
decision 
make 0.726 ( 0.093 ) *** 
     
Number of obs.   =  309 McFadden R2 = 0.60 
  
Likelihood ratio test of  make = 0:   
chi2(1) =  28.0646   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Wald chi2(42)  =  128.28 Log likelihood =  -139.4126    Prob > chi2  =  0.0000 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% level; Standard errors in parentheses  
 
In the hypothesis 2 we indicate that “firms that are part of a larger group of companies 
or of a relational network are more likely to innovate in-house to benefit reduction costs 
in reducing contractual uncertainty and accessing group resources”. Being part of a 
holding (holding) increases the likelihood of outsourcing instead of implementing in-
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house projects. Moreover it doesn’t affect the likelihood to make innovations such as 
the firm participation in networks (consort). Therefore H2 doesn’t hold according to our 
empirical results.  
In hypothesis 3 we focalize on theoretical arguments related to strategic management 
such as the role of organization and more specifically we state that “the organisation 
culture of cooperatives makes in-house innovation less costly than outsourcing. 
Cooperatives should then be more incline to innovate in-house”. Results indicate that 
ceteris paribus the organizational formal status (such as being a cooperative) doesn’t 
matter that much in the decision process of making-buying innovations.  
If we look at hypothesis 4 we indicate that “firms evolving in tight appropriability 
conditions will be more incline to outsource innovation than firms evolving in a weak 
appropriability setting”. This is substantially confirmed by empirical results which 
don’t indicate any impacts on buying decision while a strong negative effect on the 
likelihood of the firm to implement in-house projects. 
In our empirical results size doesn’t matter therefore hypothesis 5 which states that “the 
size of the firm has an effect on innovation sourcing strategy” doesn’t apply to food 
firms.  
In hypothesis 6 we indicate that “process innovation is more likely to be outsourced 
than product innovation”. Also in this case results partially confirm the hypothesis 
because while we can highlight that more process related innovations are more likely to 
be outsourced it also applies to product innovations. Moreover it seems that also making 
decisions are considered therefore indicating that a clear-cut relationship doesn’t exist. 
Hypothesis 7 states that “firms with constrained human resources are more likely to 
engage in outsourcing during the innovation process”. Results indicate (per_empl_rd) 
that this hypothesis holds and that food firms with higher application of human capital 
in R&D activities are less likely to implement out-sourcing innovative projects. The 
same applies for hypothesis 8 confirming that “‘Old firms are more innovative than 
young ones” when we consider buying decisions (age).  
Finally looking at hypothesis 9 which states that “firms with a highly sophisticated 
information and communication technology system are more likely to outsource their 
innovation activities”. Results don’t confirm this statement while indicating a strong 
positive correlation between investment in ICT and making innovation decisions.  
Among the control variables we use to test the role of location and local interactions 
only the index of the capacity of capital accumulation in the region of location has 
showed a significant correlation. Food firms located in area with higher intensity of 
investments are less likely to make innovation in-house but not necessary this is 
transferred in outsourcing strategies. It means that food firms do not fully benefit of a 
better environment of implement innovative strategies. It also indicates that internal 
factors seem to be more relevant than external ones.  
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
 
This paper investigates the likelihood of Italian food companies in sourcing their 
innovation activities in and/or outside the boundaries of their organization structure. 
Despites  the large amount of empirical and theoretical literature on the issue of 
innovation in manufacturing sector less papers have focalized on the specific trade-off 
of making and buying innovation in the food sectors. We pose a certain number of 
research hypotheses and use the empirical data to test them. Results highlight that only 
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some of the theoretical statements can effectively be confirmed empirically. For 
example making and buying decisions have to be consider as a synergic rather than 
alternative actions, indicating that it is the overall propensity of the food firm to 
innovate that matters instead of the process of innovation in itself In other words it 
matters whether or not the food firm is open to innovation. When this propensity is 
higher enough then the implementation of such attitude is done mainly through a 
multiple-strategy approach. 
Focalising more on the specific factors affecting the making or buying decisions we 
have found a more puzzling behaviour than we would expect on the base of merely 
theoretical argumentations. We figure it out that sunk costs and specificity of 
investments matter as indicated by the more transactional cost economics approach 
while little significance should be given to other features such as belonging to a larger 
group or the legal status of the company. This is indicating that other factors matter 
slightly more in the food sector in comparison to the overall manufacturing one. 
Interesting indications arrive from the role of features such as market competition, size 
and type of innovation. We found out that size doesn’t matter that much if we are 
analysing the likelihood to buy or make innovation while the degree of concentration in 
the specific sub-sector in which the company operates matters and the same applies for 
the type of innovation. A higher concentration reduces the likelihood to implement in-
house projects while not affecting the likelihood to out-source them. Therefore in a 
highly concentrated market we should expect that internal initiatives related to 
innovation are substantially depressed. An argument often used in this case relates to 
impossibility of the company to cope with low market-power and higher risk of internal 
innovation projects. In this case innovation are difficult, mainly incremental while other 
strategies (i.e. advertising, restyling or repositioning the products) are often 
implemented.  The likelihood of a company to make and buy innovation increases  both 
in case of process and product innovation, again indicating that what really matters is 
the decision on whether or not to innovate.  
A final set of hypotheses was made following the resource-based view approach. In this 
theoretical framework human resources, firm dynamicity and internal vs. external 
communications and ties matter more than in other approaches. Empirical results 
indicate that these factors can have a role in determining making and buying decision 
but less than we expected a priori. For example the more the company invests in human 
resources applied to R&D activities the less it is likely to buy innovation, but this factor 
is not significant in term of likelihood to make innovation. While older firms are more 
likely to internally innovate , developing higher communication capacities do not lead 
to external ties but increase the likelihood to implement internal innovative projects.  
The overall picture we can draw by using the empirical results shows the absence of a 
clear-cut dynamics in making and buying decisions in the Italian food companies. It 
seems that the main concern of Italian food companies is whether or not to innovate 
instead of which type of strategy to implement. The substantial absence of evidences 
indicating positive effects of the external environment on the companies` strategy is 
also an element for thinking about policy and managerial strategies in this domain. 
More synergies should be developed and also more capacity to select differential path of 
innovation should be stimulated in food companies. In a context where the prevalence 
of food firms is based on SMEs the capacity to innovate via outsourcing is fundamental. 
The capacity to both public and private collaborations to induce this mechanism is very 
limited according to our empirical results.  
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